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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of public research and development (R&D) support on 
cost reducing innovation for wind turbine farms in Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom (UK). First we survey the literature in this field.  The literature indicates that 
in Denmark R&D policy has been more successful than in Germany or the UK in 
promoting innovation of wind turbines. Furthermore, such studies point out that 
(subsidy-induced) capacity expansions were more effective in the UK and Denmark in 
promoting cost-reducing innovation than in Germany. The second part of the paper 
describes the quantitative analysis of the impact of R&D and capacity expansion on 
innovation. This is calculated using the two-factor learning curve (2FLC) model, in 
which investment cost reductions are explained by cumulative capacity and the R&D 
based knowledge stock. Time-series data were collected for the three countries and 
organized as a panel data set. The parameters of the 2FLC model were estimated, 
focusing on the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the parameters across countries. We 
arrived at robust estimations of a learning-by-doing rate of 5.4% and a learning-by-
searching rate of 12.6%. The analysis underlines the homogeneity of the learning 
parameters, enhancing the validity of the 2FLC formulation.  
Keywords: costs, innovation, learning, R&D, wind energy 
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Public R&D and Innovation: The Case of Wind Energy in 
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom  
Ger Klaassen, Asami Miketa, Katarina Larsen, and Thomas Sundqvist 
1. Introduction 
The development of environmentally compatible energy technologies has been 
accelerated in response to the growing concern of the impacts from climate change. 
However, (liberalized) market circumstances are often unfavorable for those new 
technologies because they tend to be more expensive than existing but not necessarily 
environmentally benign technologies. Innovation that leads to cost reduction is therefore 
crucial for these environmentally benign technologies in order to gain larger market 
shares and policy interventions to initiate such innovations are called for. Such policy 
interventions can be justified on the basis of “technological learning”. “Technological 
learning” refers to the phenomenon that the cost of a technology decreases as the 
cumulative installation of the technology increases (Argote and Epple, 1990; Arrow, 
1962; Dosi, 1988; Dutton and Thomas, 1984). Technology policies would stimulate 
innovation and higher up-front costs could be recovered in the long run after successful 
technological learning. Without proper policy measures for new technologies, current 
technologies would however maintain their competitive advantage and remain locked-in 
a situation relying on technologies that might not be environmentally friendly. In the 
past, technology-policies such as procurement subsidies and public R&D support have 
played a key role in promoting cost-reducing innovation of environmentally benign 
technologies.  
In the conventional learning literature, focus is given on the effect of capacity expansion 
(possibly stimulated by procurement policy) of the cost-reducing innovation. The 
purpose of this paper is to extend the conventional analysis of the learning effects by 
including the effect of R&D, based on experience with wind energy in three European 
countries: Denmark, Germany, and UK.  
We focus on wind energy, as it is currently one of the fastest growing energy sources 
and a carbon–free alternative for traditional fossil fuel based technologies. The selection 
of the three countries was based on the following arguments: Denmark is the largest 
global exporter of wind turbines and has the highest per capita levels of wind energy 
capacity installed. Germany has the highest capacity installed worldwide (BWE, 2001). 
The UK, in contrast to Denmark and Germany, promoted competition among different 
renewable energy forms through the introduction of a competitive bidding scheme for 
subsidies. 
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Although an abundance of theoretical literature exists on the effects of policy 
instruments on innovation, surprisingly little empirical research has been conducted (see 
Jaffe et al., 2001). Our analysis is empirical and based on a review of wind energy 
policy in the three countries and on technological learning concepts. This paper differs 
from the existing literature on the relation between policy instruments and innovation 
for wind energy (e.g., Hemmelskamp, 1999; Loiter and Norberg-Bohm, 1999, Mitchell, 
1995 and 2000) since the focus is on the quantification of the impacts of policy 
instruments on innovation (i.e., public R&D).  
The quantification was done based on a modified version of the two-factor learning 
curve (2FLC) model introduced by Kouvaritakis et al., (2000). The 2FLC is an 
extended version of the conventional learning curve (based only on cumulative 
capacity) in that it includes both cumulative capacity and knowledge stock (resulting 
from past R&D expenditures). This is a rather novel concept and its empirical validation 
has not yet been demonstrated successfully. One of the important contributions of this 
paper is thus to attempt to give a solid empirical foundation by using an econometric 
analysis using panel data for three countries. In addition, our version of the 2FLC 
refines the original knowledge stock concept, based on simple cumulative R&D, by 
introducing a concept of knowledge based on cumulative R&D adjusted by the 
depreciation of the knowledge stock as well as a time lag between actual timing of R&D 
expenditures and their addition to the R&D based knowledge stock.  
Section 2 describes the different policies in the three countries to promote the diffusion 
of wind energy and summarizes the literature on the impacts of R&D and (policy-
induced) capacity expansions on innovation in these countries. Section 3 introduces the 
two-factor learning curve model that is used to assess the impacts of policy instruments 
on cost reducing innovation. Section 4 summarizes the data for our panel analysis. 
Section 5 gives the results of the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes and 
discusses the results obtained. 
2. Policy Instruments for Promoting Innovation in Wind Energy 
Progress in wind turbine technology can be attributed to R&D programs and 
accumulated experience in producing wind turbines. Capacity expansion leading to 
enhanced experience in producing wind turbines can partially be gained by financial 
incentives to increase demand such as subsidies. This section will have a closer look at 
R&D programs and demand-based incentives in three European countries for promoting 
the wind energy.  
2.1. Denmark 
The promotion of wind energy became important in Denmark in the mid-1970s. 
Already in 1991, wind turbines provided around 3% of the Danish electricity 
consumption. By the end of 1999, capacity had grown to 1771 megawatts (MW). The 
investment subsidy between 1979 and 1989 was instrumental in achieving such a rapid 
expansion of the capacity. This subsidy scheme offered 30% of the total investment cost 
for the installation of wind turbines that were approved by a test station (Olivecrona, 
1995). From the mid-1980s, the Danish government provided another kind of incentive 
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consisting of a partial refund for the energy and environmental taxes levied on 
electricity consumption in Denmark. This in effect consisted of the payment of a 
guaranteed tariff that was paid out to the wind farm operators by the energy supply 
companies for selling electricity to the electricity companies, which helped in 
expanding overall capacity. (Morthorst, 1999). A typical characteristic of the Danish 
system is that it combined market-stimulation incentives with national targets, resulting 
in the expansion of the domestic market for wind energy (Hemmelskamp, 1999).  
A coordinated program of R&D support in all energy areas in Denmark started in 1976. 
The wind energy projects focused on the provision of information on the construction of 
large wind turbines involving Danish electricity companies, Risø National Laboratory 
and the Danish University of Technology. From 1976 to 1995, 10% of the total energy 
research program was spent on wind energy projects (Olivecrona, 1995). From 1983 to 
1989, R&D support was mainly geared towards wind farms and large wind turbines. 
The percentage of R&D funds given to small wind turbine projects increased over time.  
Evidence suggests that in Denmark R&D resulted in technically reliable wind turbines 
that were available at the end of the 1980s. After this development of the technological 
niche, subsidy schemes successfully paved the way for a market niche. In terms of R&D 
expenditures, the setting up of a test center that tested every wind turbine before being 
released on the market was relevant. R&D as well as demonstration projects in 
conjunction with investment subsidies (until the end of the 1980s) led to the 
development of reliable small wind turbines at the end of the 1970s. Part of the 
successful introduction at that stage was the shift of support away from the 
manufactures to the operators in order to stimulate further market introduction. Relevant 
in this context were the strong integration of the energy supply companies and the 
guaranteed feed-in tariff and the refunding of CO2 and energy tax to wind turbine 
operators (Hemmelskamp, 1999). The careful balance and timing of R&D expenditures 
and procurement support have both played an important function in Denmark in 
promoting both innovation and diffusion of wind energy.  
2.2. Germany 
Germany has encouraged the use of wind energy since the 1970s. The major 
government instruments that led to the rapid diffusion of wind power capacity at the end 
of the 1980s consisted of: the 100/250 MW program, the feed-in law 
(“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz”), tax breaks, as well as the provision of low-interest loans 
(Hemmelskamp, 1999). The 100/250 MW program was the combination of the 
certification programs, i.e., requirements on technical quality guaranteed by test and 
research centers and investment subsidies. The feed-in law regulates the purchasing of 
renewable electricity by public energy supply companies. These companies are obliged 
to pay at least 90% of the average electricity price paid by the final consumers to the 
companies selling them wind energy. In addition, 80 to 90% of the companies building 
wind turbines received low-interest loans (1-2% points below the market rate). The 
various subsidies reduced the risk of investments and offered a secure basis. The feed-in 
law did not only induce demand but also provided an incentive to use efficient wind 
turbines (producing more electricity) in areas with favorable wind conditions and, 
perhaps more importantly promoted product and, in particular, process innovation.  As a 
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result, wind turbines can now operate profitably at locations with favorable wind 
conditions given the feed-in tariff and the low-interest loans from the government 
(Hemmelskamp, 1999). As a final point, investment costs could be written off against 
tax as capital or operating expenses, and initial losses incurred by the operators during 
the start up period can be used to reduce tax payments in future years when the wind 
turbine becomes profitable.  In general, presently only the feed-in law tariff and the 
nationally supplied low interest loans are of major significance for the economic 
feasibility of wind energy (Hemmelskamp, 1999). 
Regarding R&D support for wind energy, it started in 1974 with the Growian 
(“Grosswindanlage“) project, which later ended in 1987. With a new focus for wind 
energy in the mid-1980s, R&D support was resumed again in Germany. This second 
wave included wind turbines with sizes of 640 to 1200 kilowatts (kW) as well as 
various projects concentrating on the development of small wind turbines. Some of the 
prototypes were later launched into the market in modified form. In Germany, the first 
R&D programs (in the 1970s) to develop large-scale wind turbines (using aerospace 
knowledge) were regarded a failure due to the considerable expenditures 
(Hemmelskamp, 1999). The progress of small wind turbines proved to be more 
successful as they were developed on the basis of engineering and shipbuilding 
knowledge. Knowledge spillovers did occur, in particular, small German windmill 
manufacturers were able to benefit from the Danish expertise.  
2.3. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the passing of the electricity act in 1989 marked the beginning 
of support for renewable energy. The act aims at promoting those forms of energy that 
are competitive. The government also set a target of 1500 MW of renewable energy 
capacity by the year 2000 (Hemmelskamp, 1999). The UK policy, created to stimulate 
the role of renewable energy (including wind), basically consists of a two-tier strategy. 
First, renewable energy policy is promoted through R&D and demonstration projects 
(Mitchell, 1995). The support budget for renewable R&D has been reduced by more 
than 50% between 1992-1993 and 1997-1998. 
Secondly, with the privatization of the electricity sector in 1989 and 1990, R&D efforts 
were complemented by a guaranteed premium price per kilowatt hour (kWh) generated 
for those projects that successfully tendered for this subsidy through the so-called non-
fossil fuel obligation (NFFO). Under the NFFO, a project that competes successfully, 
gets a contract to generate at a specified capacity, receiving its (index-linked) bid price 
for up to 15 years (DTI, 2000). The NFFO obliges public electricity suppliers or 
regional electricity companies (RECs) to buy a certain amount of renewable electricity. 
The difference between the premium price and the average monthly pool-purchasing 
price for electricity is in effect a subsidy (Mitchell, 1995). A typical element of the UK 
system is that the contracts awarded under the NFFO and the price paid for the 
renewable generation result from a process of competitive bidding within a (renewable) 
technology band on a pre-set date (Mitchell, 2000).  
In the UK, the NFFO has been less successful in increasing the capacity of wind energy. 
This was mainly due to the lack of public acceptance in the spatial planning procedure, 
 5
which, according to some authors, was related to the competitive pressure, which forced 
companies to invade profitable but sensitive sites (Elliott, 2000; Hemmelskamp, 1999; 
DTI, 2000). Mitchell (2000) finds that with respect to capacity expansion, the UK has 
not been as successful since the focus was on one single instrument such as the NFFO. 
The UK’s NFFO is believed to have been successful though in reducing prices of 
renewable energy sources down to a level where they can compete (Mitchell, 2000; 
DTI, 2000). Part of the price reduction in the UK was related to importing technologies 
(mostly Danish), the prices of which have declined as a result of their domestic markets 
as well (Mitchell, 2000). 
In the UK, R&D expenditures mainly supported large-scale wind turbines (above 
3 MW) although this later changed to smaller-scale turbines whereas the NFFO 
supported medium-sized turbines (300 to 750 kW). R&D support was biased towards a 
few large-scale projects (Mitchell, 1995). Elliott (1996) finds that the NFFO subsidy 
scheme is reasonable for supporting near-market technologies but no substitute for 
R&D support for the longer-term development of technologies for which private R&D 
support is unrealistic.  
In conclusion, the UK R&D expenditures for wind were insufficiently geared towards 
the type of turbines being installed. The UK NFFO has been successful in driving down 
costs but the downside of this was that not so much capacity has been installed. 
2.4. Summarizing Policy Review for the Three Countries 
In summary, we can conclude that: 
• In Denmark, R&D as well as demonstration projects, in conjunction with 
investment subsidies, led to the development of reliable small wind turbines. 
The careful balance and timing of R&D and procurement support have both 
been important to promote both innovation and diffusion of wind energy; 
• In Germany, the R&D programs (in the 1970s) aimed at developing large-scale 
wind failed but the development of small wind turbines was successful. The 
various subsidies (i.e., those under the feed-in-law) provided an incentive for 
product and process innovation but overlapping subsidies might have resulted in 
efficiency losses; 
• In the UK, R&D expenditures for wind were insufficiently geared towards the 
type of turbines being installed. However, the UK subsidy scheme (NFFO) has 
been successful in driving down costs. 
Concluding, the above evidence suggests that Denmark’s R&D expenditures might have 
been more successful in promoting innovation than similar expenditures in Germany or 
the UK. The policy review also indicates that the UK scheme of (subsidy-induced) 
capacity expansion and the Danish procurement support might have been more effective 
in stimulating (cost-reducing) innovation than the German support schemes. In the next 
section, we describe the quantitative analysis for this study.   
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3. The Two-Factor Learning Curve 
One measurable indicator of technological innovation is the cost reduction of 
technology. A number of studies have found an empirical relationship between cost 
reduction and cumulative capacity, and it is known as the “learning curve” (Argote and 
Apple 1990; Dutton and Thomas, 1984). Conventional learning curves include 
cumulative capacity as the explanatory factor for technology cost reduction.  
The most commonly used formulation of the learning curve looks like: 
α−
⋅= CCASPC
 (1) 
where: 
SPC  Costs of a technology per unit (specific cost) 
CC  Cumulative capacity 
-α  Learning index 
A  Specific cost at unit cumulative capacity  
The above formulation implies that for each doubling of capacity costs there is a 
constant percentage decrease, called the learning rate (calculated as α−− 21 ). Typical 
learning rates calculated for studies on wind turbines range from 4 to 32%. The range is 
dependent on the country/region studied and the indicator used (investment costs or 
production costs) to estimate the learning rate (McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001). 
From a policy point of view, a shortcoming of the above conventional one-factor 
learning curve, which uses cumulative capacity as the only explanatory factor, is that 
the learning rate – and the learning process altogether – only depends on capacity 
expansion. Hence, only procurement policies, which increase demand and hence expand 
capacity, would play a role in reducing the costs of a technology. R&D, despite its 
popularity as a policy instrument and its obvious impact on innovation in especially in 
early development phases, has no place in it. Hence the traditional learning curve does 
not assist policymakers in the allocation of scarce resources over capacity expansion 
and R&D expenditures. This is remarkable since the use of cumulative R&D 
expenditures to estimate the impact of R&D expenditures on levels of output is well 
established in both macroeconomic and sector-specific studies (see for example 
Lieberman, 1984; Griliches, 1995; Nordhaus, 2002).  
In response to this observation, Kouvaritakis et al. (2000) have proposed an extended 
learning-curve concept, the two-factor learning curve (2FLC), which includes 
cumulative R&D expenditures as the second factor, in addition to cumulative capacity 
to add a more direct policy variable in the learning curve model. We refined this 
original 2FLC by replacing the cumulative R&D with a more general knowledge stock 
concept, which takes into account the depreciation of the cumulative knowledge stock 
and adds a time lag between the actual R&D expenditures and their addition to the 
knowledge stock. Knowledge is then defined in the following way.  
xttt RDKSKS −− +⋅−= 1)1( δ  (2) 
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Where: 
KSt  R&D based knowledge stock at time t 
RDt  R&D expenditures 
x  Time lag for adding R&D to the knowledge stock  
δ  Annual knowledge stock depreciation rate 
By doing this, we take into account the following two observations. First, the effect of 
R&D is not instantaneous. Money invested in research will only deliver tangible results 
(if at all) in some future time. Just as it takes some time for a paper to be written, 
reviewed and published. Second, knowledge depreciates (compare Griliches, 1995). The 
effect of successful past R&D – knowledge – gradually becomes irrelevant.  
With this knowledge stock, the two-factor learning curve can now be formulated as:  
βα −−
⋅⋅= KSCCASPC
 (3) 
Where: 
SPC  Costs of a technology per unit (specific cost) 
CC  Cumulative capacity 
KS  R&D-based knowledge stock  
-α  Learning-by-doing index 
-β  Learning-by-searching index 
A  Specific cost at unit cumulative capacity and unit knowledge stock 
This model was estimated in a logarithmic form with an error term (ε). 
εβα +−−= )log()log()log()log( KSCCASPC
 (4) 
4. Data 
To analyze the quantitative relationship between the development of the investment 
costs over time on the one hand and cumulative capacity and the knowledge stock 
(based on R&D) on the other, we collected the following data:  
• The (average) investment costs per kW (Figure 1) 
• Cumulative capacity (Figure 2); 
• Annual public R&D expenditures (Figure 3); 
Figure 1 depicts the data collected on the investment costs. For Denmark and Germany, 
investment cost data for wind-farms installed were based on ISET (2000) and 
Durstewitz (2000). Data for the UK were based on Milborrow (2000). Note that, in 
contrast to other estimates, the investment cost data for the three countries cover all 
investment cost items, such as grid connections, foundations, electrical connections and 
not only the costs of the wind turbines (Rohrig, 2001; Varela, 2001). This is a 
significant difference since the non-turbine part of the investment costs might amount to 
10 to 40% of the overall investment costs. Figure 1 shows that in all three countries the 
investment costs have declined, albeit not continuously. Data for 1992 for the UK are 
only for one project whereas data for the other years are generally averages of various 
projects. 
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The data for the UK suggest a rapid decline in the investment costs after 1993 (the jump 
in costs for 1992 is probably due to the aforementioned data limitation). German data 
shows a regular though less sharp decrease over the whole period (1990–1998). Danish 
data suggest a gradual trend down from 1986 onwards with two periods of increasing 
costs. Differences in the level of the costs across the countries are not only related to 
country-specific factors but also reflect differences in the average size of the wind 
turbines installed. 
The development of cumulative capacity in the three countries is shown in Figure 2. 
Clearly, Denmark started early whereas Germany and the UK expanded wind energy 
capacity only in the1990s. From 1994, German wind energy capacity exceeded Danish 
capacity and the German market has now twice the size of the Danish market and is 
nearly ten times bigger than the UK market.   
Figure 3 shows the development of the annual public R&D expenditures on wind 
energy based on IEA data (2000). German expenditures have generally been higher than 
those for both other countries, with the exception of the period between 1983 and 1992. 
From the mid-1990s R&D expenditures in both Germany and the UK were cut 
significantly whereas Danish R&D outlays remained more or less stable.  
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Figure 1: Data collected on the investment costs. 
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In order to translate these annual public R&D expenditures into the development of a 
knowledge stock, assumptions are needed on the time lag between R&D expenditures 
and their addition to the knowledge stock as well as the depreciation of the knowledge 
stock. Griliches (1998:27) suggests that for commercial R&D expenditures a time lag of 
3 to 5 years might be appropriate and that depreciation would be so fast that hardly any 
of the private R&D spent 10 years ago would remain. This suggests an annual 
depreciation rate in excess of 10%. He also finds that for social (or public) R&D 
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Figure 2: Development of (on-shore) wind energy capacity installed (MW).  
Sources: ISET, 2000; DWMTA, 2000; BWEA, 2000; BWE, 2001. 
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Figure 3: Public energy R&D expenditures for wind energy, IEA, 2000. 
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expenditures, the data situation is much more difficult, but one would expect the social 
rates of depreciation to be lower than the private ones. Nordhaus (2002) indicates that 
the depreciation rates are variously estimated at 1 to 10%. IEPE (2001) uses a 
depreciation rate of 3% in calculating the R&D knowledge stock for a number of energy 
technologies. Watanabe (1999; 2000) finds a time lag of 2 to 3 years to be appropriate 
for R&D expenditures in the case of Japanese solar PV cells. Our own initial estimates 
of the time lag for solar PV and wind turbines on a global base indicated that time lags 
of 2 to 3 years and depreciation rates of around 5% lead to acceptable statistical results 
(Kobos, 2000). For this study we use a depreciation rate of 3% and a time lag of 2 years. 
We think the shorter time lags (2-3 years) are more appropriate for our work since they 
were derived for individual energy technologies (such as solar PV) rather than from 
studies with an industry specific or macroeconomic orientation (such as Griliches, 1998; 
Nordhaus, 2002). 
Figure 4 depicts the result of this calculation of the knowledge stock. Clearly, the effect 
of reducing R&D expenditures in the UK since the beginning of the 1990s becomes 
noticeable and the depletion effect of old knowledge overweighs the creation of the new 
knowledge in the very recent years. This is not yet the case in Germany due to the time 
lags and the depreciation rate of public (R&D-based) knowledge. 
5. Assessment of the Impact of R&D and Capacity Expansion  
This section analyzes the effect of the cumulative capacity expansion and public R&D 
expenditures on the innovation of wind turbines in a quantitative way based on the 
above-introduced 2FLC. In this example, we used time-series data for the three 
countries, organized as a panel data set (a data set that combines time series and cross 
sections).  
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Figure 4: Development of the R&D based knowledge stock for wind power 
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Analyzing a panel data set has several advantages over an analysis done based on time 
series of single country data. The first advantage is that the sample size increases and 
that we therefore obtain results that are more statistically reliable. Estimation of the 
learning curve for a relatively new technology such as wind is usually unreliable since 
sample sizes are typically limited to short time periods, i.e., insufficient degrees of 
freedom. For example, in our dataset, there are 14 data points for Denmark, and 10 for 
Germany and the UK each. By pooling the time series data and cross-section data, the 
number of observation points increases to 34, which gives us sufficient degrees of 
freedom for the statistical analysis. 
The second advantage of a panel data analysis is the possibility to analyze cross-
sectional variation, i.e., the homogeneity and heterogeneity across countries. The panel 
data analysis is suitable for testing whether the “learning” phenomenon, more 
specifically the capacity-related learning coefficient and the knowledge-based searching 
coefficient, has a technology-specific character or country-specific character.  
5.1. Fixed-Effect Model: Common Slopes and Country-Specific Intercepts  
Two possible error specifications of an econometric model with panel data are those of 
fixed and random-effects models. In this case, a fixed-effect specification is to be 
preferred since we are primarily interested in capturing within-country variations among 
the specific countries chosen for the study. The random-effects specification, however, 
would have been appropriate if we were drawing N countries randomly from a large 
population (Baltagi, 1995). The fixed-effects model assumes common slope coefficients 
and different intercepts across cross-sections (in our case they are countries). In the 
specific context of our two-factor learning curve estimation, all three countries are 
assumed to have common learning parameters but the specific costs at unit cumulative 
capacity and unit knowledge stock are different across the three countries. Note that we 
estimate the 2FLC in a logarithmic form (equation 4), thus the coefficients for the 
learning parameters become slopes and parameter A becomes the intercept of the model. 
The validities of these assumptions are then tested statistically.  
Table 1 presents the result of our estimation of the two-factor learning curve based on 
the fixed-effect model. One common set of learning parameters is estimated for three 
countries and parameter A is estimated for each country. The important point to 
underline here is that all estimated parameters have the expected (negative) sign. In 
many cases with the estimation based on single time series, such estimates often result 
in counterintuitive positive signs, especially for the impact of cumulative R&D 
expenditures (compare Criqui et al, 2000; Kouvaritakis et al., 2000).  
Note that panel analysis itself does not assure the improved result in terms of signs. 
However, there is an improvement compared with the result based on separate country 
estimations, given that the uncertainty in estimating the parameter A and the uncertainty 
in estimating the learning parameters are partially separated by the use of the fixed-
effect model. What this means is that with an estimation based on single country data, 
country specifications are included in the estimated parameter and there is no way to 
separate them from the “pure” part of “learning parameter” which is assumed robust (by 
the formulation of the fixed-effect model) regardless of a selection of countries. With 
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the fixed effect model formulation of the panel data, we can eliminate unobserved 
country-specific variation from the learning parameters estimation, and by doing it we 
can obtain more robust estimations of the learning parameters, which is of particular 
analytical interest for energy modeling purposes.  
If we translate the estimated parameters into a learning-by-doing rate (based on 
cumulative capacity) of 5.4% and a learning-by-searching rate (based on the knowledge 
stock) of 12.6%, we also obtain results that fit well with ranges obtained in other studies 
(Kouvaritakis et al., 2000; McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001). The t-statistics for 
each variable also indicate that all of them are statistically significant. We also observe 
that the overall fit of the equation is reasonably good, showing an R-square of 0.75.  
Table 1: The result of the 2FLC based on the fixed-effect model. 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
LOG (Cumulative Capacity) (α) -0.08 -3.68** 
LOG (Knowledge Stock) (β) -0.19 -2.22* 
DK—C (A) 8.58 34.51** 
DE—C (A) 8.94 23.34** 
UK—C (A) 8.78 24.68** 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.75 (0.72) 
Note: t-statistics marked with double asterisks (**) mean that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 
zero is rejected at the 1-percent level of significance; those with a single asterisk (*) imply a rejection at a 
level of 5%. 
5.2. Statistical Test of Cross-Country Variation 
The fixed-effect model is built on two assumptions, (1) common slopes (common 
learning parameters) and (2) different intercept terms (different parameter A) across 
countries. The next step of this study was to test these two assumptions statistically. 
Such tests are carried out by formulating two alternative panel data models and compare 
the sums of their squared residuals with the fixed-effect model. One alternative panel 
data model is formulated with common slopes and a common intercept for all countries; 
the other consists of different intercepts and different slopes for each country. For ease 
of reference, they are numbered as follows: 
(I) Common regression for all countries (Common slopes, common intercept) 
(II) Different intercepts, common slopes (fixed-effect model) 
(III) Different intercepts, different slopes  
The test of different (country-specific) intercepts (parameter A) is performed by 
contrasting model I with model II. The test of common learning parameters (common 
slopes) is performed by contrasting model II with model III. Whether these assumptions 
are statistically accepted or not can be assessed by examining the F-statistics, which are 
calculated using the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) and the degrees of freedom 
(DF) in the estimation of two contrasted formulations. The exact formulation of the test 
statistics is as follows. 
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Null hypothesis for differential slopes:  
H0:  Germany =  UK =  Denmark and  Germany =  UK = Denmark 
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Null hypothesis for differential intercepts: 
H0: A Germany = A UK = A Denmark 
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We performed ordinary least square estimations for the three models. The sum of the 
squared residuals and the degrees of freedom for the estimations are summarized in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: The results of Model I - III. 
Model Sum of squared residual Degrees of freedom 
Common slope and common intercept (I) SSRI = 0.427 32 
Common slope and different intercept (II) SSRII = 0.319 30 
Different slopes and different intercept (III) SSRIII = 0.279 28 
 
Using the result of Table 2, the F-statistics were calculated (see Table 3). To summarize 
the results, the F-statistics for the common slope was insignificant and thus the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. Hence the evidence supports the existence of common 
learning parameters for each country. The F-statistics for the common intercept was 
significant and the null hypothesis was rejected at a 1% significance level. These tests 
of the model specifications thus support the formulation of the fixed effect model for 
the two-factor learning curve, whose results were presented in the previous section. 
Table 3: F-statistics and probability. 
Null-hypothesis F statistics Probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
Common slopes (learning 
indexes α and β) (II-III) 0.94 0.40 
Common intercept (A) (I-II) 5.01 0.01 
 
The t-test for the common slope showed that the specific cost at unit cumulative 
capacity and knowledge stock (A) appears to differ between countries. This does not 
strike us as surprise. There is no a priori reason that we can assume that they are 
identical, given the difference in price level in general and difference in country specific 
circumstances such as building codes and siting requirements prevailed in the three 
countries. The test for the common slope suggested that learning parameters are 
common to the three countries and “country effects” were not observed with these 
parameters. This implies that for the three countries and the wind technology we 
examined, “technological learning” seems to be a technology-specific phenomenon, 
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rather than a country-specific one. The overall results enhance the validity of the 2FLC 
formulation as a technology specific phenomenon.  
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper examined the impact of (subsidy-induced) capacity expansion and public 
R&D expenditures on cost reducing innovation for wind turbine farms in Denmark, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. In doing so, we used an extended version of the 
traditional learning curve that now incorporates both (public) R&D expenditures as well 
as cumulative capacity expansion as variables. We used panel data to estimate the 
learning curve.  
Our survey of the literature suggests that in Denmark, R&D as well as demonstration 
projects, in conjunction with investment subsidies, led to the development of reliable 
small wind turbines and the careful balance and timing of R&D and procurement 
support promoted both innovation and diffusion of wind energy. In Germany, the R&D 
programs to develop large-scale wind failed but the development of small wind turbines 
was successful. The various subsidies provided an incentive for product and process 
innovation but overlapping subsidies might have resulted in efficiency losses. In the 
UK, R&D expenditures for wind were insufficiently geared towards the type of turbines 
being installed. The UK subsidy scheme (NFFO) has been successful in driving down 
costs. This suggests that R&D policy in Denmark was most successful in supporting 
innovation and capacity-promoting subsidies were most effective in Denmark and 
Germany in stimulating innovation.  
The statistical analysis of the investment cost reductions of wind generation 
technologies in the three countries supported the validity of the two-factor learning 
curve formulation, in which the cost reductions are explained by cumulative capacity 
and the R&D-based knowledge stock. The analysis suggests that the learning 
parameters for the three countries are not found to be significantly different. In the 
fixed-effect specification of the panel data, learning parameters are common to the three 
countries but the initial parameter A differs for the three countries. In addition, all the 
estimated parameters were statistically significant and the learning parameters (which 
are 5.4% for learning-by-doing and 12.6% for the R&D based, learning-by-searching 
rate) have values in line with those found in the published literature.  
In concluding, we would like to note a few points for further discussion. First, the 
analysis was restricted to the 1990s due to data limitations especially on investment 
costs. Secondly, the analysis was restricted to an evaluation of public R&D 
expenditures and did not take into account private R&D expenditures as a separate 
factor. Consequently, we might have overestimated the impact of public R&D 
expenditures. Global estimates of private R&D expenditures for wind energy based on 
sales and patent data from electricity generation equipment producers suggest that over 
the last 25 years (1974-1999) private R&D expenditures for wind energy might have 
been approximately 75% higher than public R&D expenditures (Criqui et al., 2000). 
This is an area that requires more country-specific research.  
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Another area where more detailed country analysis might be warranted is the treatment 
of spillover effects between the three countries. More than 95% of the wind turbines 
installed in the United Kingdom were imported; around 80% of the installed capacity in 
the UK was imported from Denmark (BWEA, 2000; EUWINET, 2001). Nearly 40% of 
the wind turbine capacity installed in Germany was imported from Denmark, 0.5% was 
imported from the Netherlands and the rest came from domestic sources. In order to 
take this into account, we would need to refine the data and methodology we use.  
Finally, our analysis was restricted to innovation in terms of investment costs reductions 
in three countries and it might thus be that differences in innovation between the 
countries have occurred in other areas such as operating & maintenance costs and 
efficiency improvements.  
Bearing in mind these points, we believe that our approach based on the extended 
learning curve is a potentially powerful tool for policy makers to assess the impact of 
reducing or increasing R&D expenditures on technology costs and hence the diffusion 
of carbon-free wind turbines. It also offers a tool to start thinking on the appropriate 
level, as well as the optimal allocation of subsidies between procurement (such as feed-
in tariffs and investment subsidies) and public R&D support so as to steer long-term 
technological development into the desired direction.  
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